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The first blush of the Georgian Rose and Ukrainian Orange revolutions may have faded 
but the specter of democracy still haunts Eurasia and has induced a kind of hysteria 
among the dictators of the CIS and their supporters. (1)
            
While Ukraine's revolution has encouraged reformers; Russian and Central Asian elites 
are defensive, charging that this revolution was "stage-managed" (to use Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov’s term) (2) from abroad, namely by the United States and 
associated NGOs.  Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev compared the supposed U.S. export 
of revolution to the Bolshevik export of socialist revolution, an indicator of his regime’s 
panic over the situation. (3) Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused 
the United States of applying double standards to engineer anti-Russian and pro-
Western political outcomes under the guise of democracy. (4) Allegedly, Americans used 
a technique that had been perfected earlier in Serbia, Georgia, and now Ukraine.  
            
According to Kremlin commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov, the Kremlin views this 
revolution as a “refined special operation” or as an externally directed unconstitutional 
coup against Russia to eliminate its influence in the CIS and replace it with an American 
presence. (5) Professor Aleksei Pushkov of the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations called Ukraine a continuation of the “West’s strategic line of staging a political 
takeover of the post-Soviet space.” (6) And Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov said 
that, "as inspections have shown, the activities of certain NGOs created at the expense 
of various sponsors go far beyond their declared charters and programs to carry out 
specific goals ordered up by others." (7) As a result, the CIS leaders (8) have made it 
clear that they will resolutely resist this so-called export of revolution to their countries, 
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even by force if necessary. Here they clearly rely upon Russian support as Moscow long 
ago made clear its refusal to export democracy, i.e., support democratic reform, in 
Central Asia or the Caucasus. (9)
            
Thus, revolution, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, is allegedly a foreign plot introduced 
by enemies of the regime to destabilize otherwise legitimate governments.  Not content 
with denying the popular roots of democratic social change in Georgia 2003 and 
Ukraine 2004, these leaders have acted in suspiciously synchronized fashion to forestall 
any repetition of Ukraine’s revolution and to launch heightened repression against 
reformers.  In Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan the authorities have 
used the political police, courts, and election authorities to ban unwanted opposition 
candidates and in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan they have threatened violence. (10)  In 
Kyrgyzstan, when opposition forces coalesced in revolution and, most notably in 
Andijan, resorted to the use of force was rejected, and the Kyrgyz President fled, 
instead, to Moscow.
            
In Karimov’s January 2005 speech to the newly-elected Parliament – itself the result of 
a parody of a democratic Parliamentary election – he gestured to the diplomatic loge 
and stated that,
Examination of some Western aid groups has shown that their activity goes far beyond 
declared programs and it aims at certain goals.  --- We have enough power to curb the 
aid groups that violate our laws, I hope those sitting at the balcony understand 
that.” (11) 
This sort of thing might be expected in Uzbekistan and has duly occurred there, where 
tough repressions have been launched repeatedly against Western NGOs; Kyrgyzstan’s 
reaction to the Ukrainian revolution had followed the same script.  Kyrgyzstan’s 
Parliamentary elections took place on February 27, 2005 and Presidential elections will 
take place in October.  Demonstrations in Bishkek late in 2004 supporting Ukraine's 
revolution made the government particularly anxious, almost hysterical, about the 
2
possibilities of a Kyrgyz “yellow (or tulip) revolution.”  As a result Akayev and other 
officials toured Kyrgyzstan and Russia making fiery speeches denouncing America’s 
export of revolution and promising to fight it. (12) Akayev, Karimov, and Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, President of Kazakstan, all have received solid expressions of support 
from Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that this Central Asian and Russian 
reaction to the orange revolution is itself "stage-managed" and certainly externally 
synchronized.
            
Of course, these statements about the external origins of the revolutions and of 
supposed foreign or opposition elements’ attempts to use them to subvert the 
government represent an effort to conceal the fact that the Ukrainian revolution, like 
Georgia's before it, was fueled by internal discontent.  Obviously, these leaders think or 
want to think that all dissent must be inspired by foreign forces, not wanting to 
acknowledge that such discontent as arose in Kyiv and Tbilisi, not external support, is 
what could trigger a reversal of fortune for ruling leaders.  But these outbursts of 
hysteria signify more than that.
            
In Kyrgyzstan, Akayev and his followers had tirelessly proclaimed the threat of a coup 
d’état, of revolution being imported from the outside by a “clandestine international,” and 
of attempts by terrorists, drug runners, and other enemies to exploit the elections either 
by financing the opposition or encouraging a repeat of events in Ukraine by charging 
rigged elections and thereby delegitimizing the government. (13) To listen to Kyrgyz 
elites who charged that the opposition was only made up of disaffected former officials 
who are receiving money and instructions from foreign, i.e. American sources, one 
might have gotten the impression that the only thing missing from this scenario was little 
green men emerging from a spaceship saying we are here to bring you democracy.  
Akayev’s deputies were no less assiduous in charging that the opposition in Parliament 
was making moves that looked like a replica of the Georgian Rose revolution.  The 
former Foreign Minister, Askar Aytmatov, denounced the idea of velvet revolutions and 
extolled Kyrgyzstan’s alleged transition to a new more democratic form of governance, 
a form of rule that has yet to be seen. (14) If anything, as a recent U.S. analysis of 
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Kyrgyzstan has shown, it had regressed in virtually every political and economic way 
from its earlier promise. (15) Likewise, Kyrgyzstan's ruling party had accused the West, 
and especially U.S. Ambassador Stephen Young, of siding with opposition leaders and 
thus interfering in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs. (16)
            
These types of warnings and charges have become standard operating procedure by 
now, and it is unlikely that anyone possessing some political literacy seriously believes 
them except frightened officials who have fallen victim to their own propaganda.  But in 
both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan these charges suggest a much deeper apprehension 
by ruling elites that they, like Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Edvard Shevarnadze in 
Georgia, if not Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, have something to fear.  What these 
remarks and threats against the opposition and foreign promoters of democratic reforms 
signify is that the ruling elites recognize their own fundamentally illegitimate governance 
and understand that they no longer enjoy genuine popular support and that the future is 
quite unpredictable.  Hence any sign of weakness or of reform on their part either invites 
or seems to them to represent a threat to the entire state and all public order.
            
In Uzbekistan during 2004, public violence broke out on four different occasions, 
terrorism was implicated in at least two of them, and there is visible evidence from 
reporting inside the country as well as from foreign travelers there that the public is 
utterly disaffected from the regime.  In other words, only repression may suffice to keep 
Karimov in power, and that may not be enough.  Indeed, even Karimov’s neighbors like 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan are increasingly alarmed that the harshness of Uzbek rule 
has created or exported instability and revived terrorist movements like the Islamic 
Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) or Hizb ut-Tahrir that are causing terrorism in their own 
countries.  And they have the evidence to prove or confirm these growing 
apprehensions. (17) As Ahmed Rashid writes,
The closing down of Uzbekistan is more than a threat to the country's own population.  It 
also represents a growing danger to all Central Asian nations.  The arbitrary behavior 
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of Karimov's administration is increasingly seen as a destabilizing factor for the 
entire region. (18) (emphasis author)
            
Clearly the rising potential for unrest in Uzbekistan due to the brutality, corruption, 
economic stagnation, and periodic violence thoroughly alarms other Central Asian 
governments that worry about the spread of violence into their own countries which 
could worsen if Karimov's regime falls.  For instance, Vladimir Bozhko, First Deputy 
Director of Kazakhstan's National Security Committee, warned publicly that as long as 
Uzbekistan's and Afghanistan's populations remain economically depressed and the 
local situation in those countries remains politically volatile, Kazakhstan will be at risk 
from terrorist attacks.  Moreover, he and other Kazak authorities have repeatedly caught 
Uzbeks engaged in terrorism within Kazakhstan, or going back and forth to Uzbekistan, 
a pattern repeated as well in Kyrgyzstan. (19) 
            
Thus this inner sense of illegitimacy and weakness and the resort to threats of violence 
makes this atmosphere of extravagant and unfounded charges dangerous for all of 
Central Asia and increases the likelihood of attempted violence by the government.  We 
now know that government inspired violence almost broke out in Ukraine. (20) During 
the unrest in Uzbekistan, force was used with alacrity.  High-ranking officials in 
Kyrgyzstan mobilized their troops to prepare to use force.  A draft law before parliament 
would have banned all public demonstrations not registered nine days in advance and 
designated the presidential residence, Parliament, and certain governmental buildings 
and transportation routes as off limits. (21) In similar fashion, the government called a 
meeting of the Defense Council in December 2004 although this may have violated its 
statute.  Former Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev here lumped together the threat of 
terrorism which Kyrgyz authorities routinely have warned about for more than two years 
with that of an electoral victory by the opposition which would, he charged, destabilize 
the country. (22) At this meeting of the Defense Council, which by law is not supposed 
to meet until after martial law has been declared, Akayev ordered his colleagues to do 
their utmost to make certain that public safety, Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty and the 
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country’s territorial integrity were all defended.  And here he explicitly invoked the 
military component. (23)
            
In January 2005, Tanayev reportedly met with regional governors and informed them 
that Akayev had sanctioned repressive measures against the opposition up to and 
including the physical elimination of regime opponents.  The startling success of 
opposition forces in Kyrgystan, as well as the swift departure of Akayev suggests that 
elites might have prepared in advance for an array of possible contingencies afer the 
elections.  Fortunately, Kyrgystan has managed, thus far, to avoid the use of force in its 
"tulip revolution."
            
In light of President Bush’s inaugural and State of the Union speeches calling for an end 
to tyranny in the world, it is more than an academic question how Washington will 
respond to repression in Uzbekistan.  While Washington clearly has supported free 
elections and made evident its unhappiness with corrupt, repressive regimes whether in 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, it certainly is not sponsoring revolutions there, nor 
is it teaching techniques for overthrowing dictators. (24) Only Russia and its client 
dictators in the CIS benefit from spreading this false rumor.  It is also more than likely 
that Moscow’s support lies behind these moves against democracy in the Central Asian 
states.  That support would only further confirm the validity of the warnings offered by 
former Georgian President Edvard Shevarnadze’s former Assistant, Tesmur Basilia, who 
wrote in 2003 that,
Nowadays there are many in the West who believe that Russia has changed – and, 
having reformed, seeks to interact with neighboring countries in conformity with 
international norms.  Some Eurasian countries would disagree with this opinion, and 
believe instead that the Russian mentality has not changed much, and that Russia 
continues to deem the “near abroad” as its sphere of social influence.  After the second 
war with Chechnya, many think that Russia regards violence as its major tool for 
resolving social and political problems, especially with regard to non-Russian peoples 
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from the former empire.  Thus integration into the international community should be 
viewed as a guarantee for security and further development. (25)
Basilia similarly observed that in many CIS states, e.g. Georgia and Ukraine, “the acute 
issue of choosing between alignment with Russia and the West is associated with the 
choice between two models of social development.” (26)
            
Indeed, Russia's democratic deformities lead its rulers to espouse policies that exploit 
and perpetuate the pathologies common to Central Asian regimes in order to turn them 
to the benefit of the Russian state or its component elites. (27)  In turn, Central Asian 
rulers, and not just Karimov, look to Russia for support against pressures for reform. 
(28) Certainly Karimov has turned increasingly to Moscow and Beijing, not least 
because of Western pressures to reform. (29) In return, China also opposes reform in 
Central Asia lest it energize Xinjiang’s  opposition at home and works with Uzbekistan to 
gain influence there in return for greater persecution of Uighurs in Uzbekistan. (30)
Thus, the great game in the CIS is becoming not just a political contest but an 
ideological one as well; not only will there be a political and even ideological struggle 
with Russia during President Bush’s term, there will also be one with Central Asian 
governments who will enjoy the overt and covert support of Russia and China insofar as 
democratization issues appear on the agenda.  For these reasons, we need to start 
asking ourselves just what does it mean for the future of U.S. relations with local 
governments and Russia, if democracy becomes their enemy and our banner?  Will the 
hysteria now being expressed and institutionalized throughout the post-Soviet space 
make it easier for us, or for those governments, to achieve peace, security and 
democracy, not to mention a functioning alliance against terrorism?  The fact that this 
remains an open question suggests just how explosive Central Asia may soon become.
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